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Abstract 
 
We study the pattern of correlations across a large number of behavioral regularities, with the 
goal of creating an empirical basis for more comprehensive theories of decision-making. We 
elicit 21 behaviors using an incentivized survey on a representative sample (n = 1;000) of the 
U.S. population. Our data show a clear and relatively simple structure underlying the 
correlations between these measures. Using principal components analysis, we reduce the 21 
variables to six components corresponding to clear clusters of high correlations. We examine the 
relationship between these components, cognitive ability, and demographics, and discuss the 
theoretical implications of the structure we uncover. 
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1 Introduction
Decades of research in economics and psychology has identified a large number of behavioral
regularities—specific patterns of behavior present in the choices of a large fraction of deci-
sion makers—that run counter to the standard model of economic decision-making. These
findings have spurred extensive theorizing about individual behaviors, leading to at least as
many models as regularities. A parsimonious model linking behaviors would be extremely
useful, especially for economists working outside of behavioral economics. However, the use-
fulness of such a model depends on it being broadly representative of the actual empirical
linkages between behaviors.
In this paper, we study the pattern of correlations across a large number of behavioral
regularities, with the goal of creating an empirical basis for more comprehensive theories
of decision-making. We provide data that can be used to construct parsimonious models
under the assumption that patterns of correlations in the population are indicative of useful
areas of theoretical exploration. We focus on standard measures of preferences and beliefs
in the (behavioral) economics literature, as described in Section 2. We elicit 21 behaviors,
from a representative sample of the U.S. population (n = 1,000). Whenever possible, these
elicitations are incentivized: the compensation participants receive depends on their choices.
The econographics—a neologism describing measures of behaviors that have an effect on
economic decision-making—cover broad areas of social preferences (8 measures), attitudes
towards risk and uncertainty (9 measures), overconfidence (3 measures), and time preferences
(1 measure).1 We also include two measures of cognitive abilities and several demographic
variables. Moreover, we took steps to limit attenuation of correlations due to measurement
error by eliciting many of our measures twice and using the Obviously Related Instrumental
Variables (ORIV) technique developed in Gillen et al. (2018).
1Each measure we consider here is an econographic. However, each measure is not equally useful in an
econographic profile. By analogy to demographics: the length of one’s first and third fingers is a useful de-
mographic in particular contexts, yet most demographic profiles would not include this information (Pearson
and Schipper, 2012).
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Describing, in a compact way, the 378 correlations between 21 econographic variables, as
well as cognitive and demographic variables, is a daunting task. However, we are aided by
the fact that many of the econographics fall into clusters of variables—which feature high
intra-cluster correlations and low inter-cluster correlations. To summarize these clusters,
we make use of principal components analysis (PCA), a statistical technique that produces
components—linear combinations of variables—that explain as much variation in the under-
lying behaviors as possible, as discussed in Section 3. These components highlight latent
dimensions underlying the econographic variables.2
Overall, our main finding is that there is a clear and relatively simple structure underlying
our data. We can summarize 21 econographics with six components, as shown in Section
4, and as summarized in Table 1. Two of these components underlie social preferences and
beliefs about others, two underlie risk and uncertainty. One component has explanatory
power in both the domains of social and risk preferences. A final component underlies
overconfidence measures. Time preferences are spread across a number of components, but
load most heavily on the Punishment component of social preferences. Each econographic,
except for time preferences, loads heavily on only one of the six components. These clear
patterns do not, to our knowledge, match with the predictions of any model (or group of
models), suggesting the need for new theories taking these patterns into account.
In building towards our main finding, we are aided by a fact that was not ex ante
obvious: risk and social preferences are largely—but not completely—independent. Thus,
we first study social and risk preferences independently, before combining them together
with measures of time preferences and overconfidence.
Our results show there is significant scope for representing our eight measures of social
preferences in a more parsimonious way. The behaviors we measure break down into three
2A few readers have suggested using machine learning techniques to explore the data. After PCA, we also
tried several forms of clustering, decision trees, multi-dimensional scaling and visualization techniques, and so
on. These techniques did not produce additional insight, as our sample is small compared to the heterogeneity
in 21 continuous and noisy measures. So, for example, there were no clear clusters of participants in our
data, and thus any classification scheme would not be able to find salient attributes on which to classify.
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clusters, as summarized in Table 1. In particular, altruism, trust, and two different types
of reciprocity form a cluster. Pro- and anti-social punishment are a second cluster. Finally,
two different types of inequality aversion—dislike of having more than another person and a
dislike of having less—form a third cluster. In total, this suggests that differences in behavior
within the broad domains we identify—generosity, punishment, and inequality aversion—are
less substantial than differences in behavior across those domains.
Risk preferences also show an underlying structure that is inconsistent with, and perhaps
less parsimonious than, existing theories of choice under uncertainty. Our nine measures of
risk preferences form three clusters, as summarized in Table 1. Two of these contain risk
attitudes. Willingness to pay (WTP) for a lottery ticket is part of one cluster along with risk
aversion as measured by lottery equivalents for a certain amount and a lottery. Willingness
to accept (WTA) is part of another cluster together with risk aversion for gains, losses,
and gains and losses, as measured by certainty equivalents. These two different clusters are
largely unrelated to each other.3 The third cluster consists of aversion to compound lotteries
and ambiguity aversion. These behaviors are highly correlated, consistent with previous
studies (Halevy, 2007; Dean and Ortoleva, 2015; Gillen et al., 2018). Our richer data allow
us to document that they are largely unrelated to other aspects of risk preferences.
Analyzing risk and social preferences, along with overconfidence and time preferences,
results in six components, as summarized in Table 1. Two social components and two
risk components are largely unchanged. The three overconfidence measures form a new
component. Patience loads most heavily (and negatively) on the punishment component
of social preferences. However, one social component—inequality aversion—and one risk
component—related to WTP—combine with each other. Similar links have been suggested
in prior research based on the idea that from behind the “veil of ignorance” more inequality
3Note that this finding is distinct from the different “domains” of risk attitudes often discussed in
psychology—see Weber and Johnson (2008) for a review—as we examine only one domain. Our findings
are also distinct from economic studies that document poor correlations between different elicitations of risk
attitudes—see Friedman et al. (2014) for a review—as we document a particular pattern of both high and
low correlations between measures of risk attitudes.
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creates more risk (Carlsson et al., 2005). However, our results indicate this is only true for
one of the three components of behaviors related to risk and uncertainty.
In order to facilitate the use of our findings in future theorizing, we examine, in Sec-
tion 5, the correlations between the components we identify and various other observables,
specifically, cognitive abilities and demographics. There are a number of potentially inter-
esting correlations. Four of the six components are correlated with cognitive abilities. The
strongest relationship is with the component containing measures of punishment and the
heaviest weighting of time preferences. In particular, higher cognitive ability is associated
with a lower propensity to punish and greater patience. Most correlations indicate a typical
positive relationship between cognitive ability and normatively rational behavior. However,
there is one exception: high-cognitive ability participants are more generous. Strong rela-
tionships between components and demographics are less common. The strongest links are
with education and income, although it is important to note that these variables do not seem
to be simply proxying for cognitive ability, but have their own individual effect.
Any given reader may find some connections (or lack thereof) obvious and others less
so. That is to say, no matter what one’s prior is (and it is difficult to imagine most scholars
having a strong prior over all 378 correlations we examine), we believe these results are
informative. At the very least, the pattern of high and low correlations we observe, with each
econographic loading heavily on a single component, suggests a relatively simple structure.
To our knowledge, this structure was not anticipated by the literature.
Our results have implications for existing theories that make predictions for behavior
across multiple domains, which we explore in Section 6. For example, in the realm of social
preferences, the components we identify do not obviously align with a simple model of
inequality aversion. In such models, the key driver of altruism and reciprocity would be the
same as that for a dislike of having more, yet these measures are not primarily associated
with the same component. Our results are also distinct from existing conceptualizations of
risk preferences. First, the classic delineation between risk and uncertainty determined by
5
whether or not one knows the probability distribution over outcomes (Arrow, 1951) fails to
hold: attitudes towards compound lotteries (a case of objective risk) are related to ambiguity
aversion (uncertainty), rather than other measures of objective risk attitudes. Second, the
fact that we observe two risk components is inconsistent with a view of risk aversion as being
driven by a single component, such as the curvature of the utility function. Third, while
these components appear to be linked to whether the task is similar to “buying” or “selling” a
lottery, as proposed by Sprenger (2015), our data is difficult to reconcile with either Prospect
Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) or Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006). The key reason is the
lack of positive correlation between loss aversion—as measured by an increased risk aversion
for lotteries consisting of both gains and losses—and the endowment effect. This suggests
that risk attitudes may be more complex than their common representation in economics.
Our study is uniquely suited to our aim of understanding the empirical basis for more
parsimonious behavioral models across the risk, social, time, and confidence domains. There
is a significant literature, summarized in Section 7, that examines the correlation between
two or three behavioral measures and/or cognitive ability. These more limited sets of rela-
tionships are not able to recover the nuanced structure we document here. There are a small
number of studies which do measure more behaviors (Burks et al., 2009; Dean and Ortoleva,
2015; Stango et al., 2017a; Dohmen et al., 2018). As described in the same section, these
studies differ from ours in terms of behaviors examined, incentivization, representativeness,
and how they deal with the attenuating effects of measurement error.
We conclude, in Section 8, by providing some further interpretation of our results, and
their limits. One limit is worth previewing here: we have chosen one way to organize
the description of the relationships in our data. Many others are possible. In order to
keep the analysis simple, we emphasize the difference between high and low correlations
between econographics, and pay less attention to middling correlations. While these middling
correlations may be of great interest, we focus on the bigger picture: our data suggest an
underlying organization for a long list of behaviors that are often treated independently.
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2 Design and Econographics
Four design decisions followed from our goal of providing an empirical basis for the underlying
structure of theories of behavioral decision-making. The most important was the selection of
behaviors to elicit, and the focus on widely used measures. This goal also lead to three other
design decisions: to focus on behavior rather than parameters of models, to incentivize as
many measures as possible, and to use a representative sample. We discuss these decisions,
and then turn to a description of the econographics we chose to measure.4
We follow a two-part process to collect a slate of measures capturing the core behaviors
of interest to behavioral economists. First, we chose to focus on three domains that have
been at the center of the study of preferences and beliefs in economics: risk, social, and
time preferences.5 We also included measures of overconfidence, as these have recently seen
rapid increases in scholarly interest. Our focus on preferences and beliefs implies that we
left out behaviors generally considered biases or mistakes, such as base-rate neglect or the
law of small numbers.6 Second, within these domains we focused on the behaviors that are
the core areas of interest in behavioral economics. Within risk preferences, for example, this
meant a focus on behaviors that violate the standard model—each of which has generated
voluminous theoretical and experimental literatures. To assess these behaviors, we make use
of existing approaches that allow for a continuous measure of the extent to which a behavior
is exhibited. In the interest of concision, we primarily refer to the research that inspired
each measure, rather than attempting to review the entire literature around each behavior.
As our focus is on understanding the underlying structure of behavior, we study behav-
ioral measures. For example, when measuring risk aversion we elicit certainty equivalents for
lotteries, and use (a linear transform of) them in our analyses, rather than trying to identify
4Appendix A gives implementation details omitted here. The specific question wordings, screenshots,
and other details of experimental design can be found online at hss.caltech.edu/∼snowberg/wep.html. Im-
plementation and analytic techniques are discussed in Section 3.
5We were unable to measure present bias, see Footnote 13.
6Our focus on preferences and beliefs—rather than mistakes and biases—and on continuous measures of
behaviors, are the major points of differentiation between our work and Stango et al. (2017a). See Section
7 for more detail.
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a parameter of some utility function (for example a constant relative risk aversion, or CRRA,
utility function). This allows our results to be used to inspire theories that connect behaviors
without committing to specific functional forms, which are almost surely mis-specified.7
Two final design decisions—that our study is incentivized and representative—are rel-
atively straightforward. Much of the literature we build on comes from laboratory studies
in economics, which are almost always incentivized. While there are good reasons to use
non-incentivized measures, these are largely spurred by concerns about feasibility. These
concerns were not substantial in our case, and we were motivated to move past them. In
order to make our empirical basis representative of a broad range of people, rather than
just specific subgroups, we used a representative sample. These two design decisions drove
a number of implementation details discussed in the next section.
A challenge of using a representative sample is that some participants will be poorly
educated. Elicitations must be designed with this in mind. As such, many of our behavioral
measures are based on the same elicitation technique: indifferences elicited using a multiple
price list (MPL) method. This was chosen as it allows for a more efficient estimation of indif-
ference points than asking individual binary choices—which, for an experiment of our scope,
would be infeasible—yet it is seen as easier for participants to understand than incentivized
pricing tasks (Cason and Plott, 2014). A training period, with examples and supervised trial
sessions, preceded the actual survey.8 The techniques we used to (statistically) deal with
measurement error, detailed in Section 3.2, further helped in recovering valid estimates from
these low-education populations.
7Additionally, recovering a parameter of a behavioral model through non-linear transformations of quan-
tities measured with error is problematic. For example, some participants state relatively high, or low,
certainty equivalents for lotteries that result in huge (positive and negative) CRRA coefficients. These
values dominate correlations, causing them to be more informative about measurement error than behav-
ior. Upon publication, our data will be made publicly available, and researchers interested in particular
parametric formulations can use them to test those theories, if they so desire.
8We also included dominated options at the endpoints of the MPL scales wherever possible. The undom-
inated options in these rows were pre-selected, following Andreoni and Sprenger (2012a). The software also
imposed a single crossing point.
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2.1 Social Preferences
There are many examples where people’s actions take into account the preferences and beliefs
of others, even in non-strategic settings. The motivating factors behind these acts are often
given the broad term of social preferences.
Altruism is defined as giving to strangers while expecting nothing in return. In experi-
mental economics, it is usually measured using the dictator game (Forsythe et al., 1994; Falk
et al., 2013), in which one participant decides unilaterally how to split money between them-
selves and another person. Following this literature, we measure Altruism as the amount
given to another person in the dictator game.
Trust and reciprocity are intertwined. To understand why, imagine that a stranger asks
for money for a sure-thing investment. In order to provide money in such a venture you
must trust that he will give some of the proceeds back to you. The act of giving money
back is reciprocation, which may depend on how much money you gave to the stranger. We
measure these concepts through a standard trust game: one participant (the sender) decides
how much of an endowment to send to a second (the receiver). This amount is doubled
by the experimenter, and then the receiver decides how much to send back—which is also
doubled (Berg et al., 1995). We measure Trust as the amount sent by the participant when
they are in the role of the sender. The original sender will also take the role of receiver
in a different interaction: Reciprocity: High corresponds to the amount sent back when
receiving the maximum amount, and Reciprocity: Low corresponds to the amount sent
back when receiving the lowest amount.9
People are willing to punish others for what they perceive as bad behavior—even when
that behavior does not directly affect them—and punishment is costly. To measure this, we
9These two types of reciprocity are sometimes referred to as positive and negative reciprocity. However,
negative reciprocity is usually defined as the response to the lowest possible action. In this case, the lowest
action is sending no money, to which the receiver cannot respond. Thus, to avoid confusion with the standard
usage we use low and high rather than negative and positive. Note also that each participant’s partner in
these interactions differs between when they are the sender and the receiver. Moreover, when the participant
plays the role of receiver, we use the strategy method: that is, we elicit the response for every possible
amount sent. For more details of implementation see Appendix A.
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allow participants to observe a trust game in which the sender gives all the money they have,
and the receiver returns nothing. We give each participant a stock of points to punish the
receiver—that is, to pay a cost to reduce the points the receiver gets: the amount used is
Pro-social Punishment. Prior studies document that a significant minority of people—
the percent possibly depending on culture—also punish the sender (Herrmann et al., 2008).
Thus, we also give a separate stock of points that can be used to punish the person who sent
all their money. The amount used to punish the sender is Anti-social Punishment.
Many people seem uncomfortable with having a different amount (greater or less) than
others, a phenomenon known as inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and
Rabin, 2002; Kerschbamer, 2015). Dislike Having Less is how much a person is willing to
forgo in order to ensure that they will not have less than another person. Dislike Having
More is how much a person is willing to forgo in order to ensure that they will not have
more than another person.
2.2 Measures of Risk Attitudes
To measure attitudes towards risk and uncertainty, we elicit the valuation of various prospects.
All lotteries involve only two possible payoffs, and most assign 50% probability to each.
Following the standard approach, we identify the behavioral manifestation of risk aversion
as valuing a lottery at less than its expected value. Extensive research shows that the patterns
of valuation depend on whether a lottery contains positive payoffs, negative payoffs, or both
a positive and a negative payoff.10 Thus, we include three measures of risk aversion: Risk
Aversion: Gains elicits a participant’s certainty equivalent for a lottery containing non-
negative payoffs, Risk Aversion: Losses elicits a participant’s certainty equivalent for a
lottery with non-positive payoffs, and Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss elicits a participant’s
certainty equivalent for a lottery with one positive and one negative payoff (Cohen et al.,
1987; Holt and Laury, 2002). The difference between the expected value of the lottery and
10The most familiar theoretical model of these patterns of valuation is Prospect Theory (Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979).
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a participant’s value are used in the analysis, so larger numbers indicate more risk aversion.
The endowment effect is the phenomenon that, on average, people value a good more
highly if they possess, or are endowed with, it. In our implementation, WTP is the amount
a participant is willing to pay for a lottery ticket, and WTA is the amount the participant
is willing to accept for the same ticket when she or he is endowed with it. The difference
between WTA and WTP is the Endowment Effect (Plott and Zeiler, 2005). We discuss
this as a risk preference because the object being bought and sold is a lottery ticket, but
more importantly, because of the patterns revealed in the analysis of Section 4.3.
Risk attitudes often change when one of the available options offers certainty, as demon-
strated through the common ratio effect (Allais, 1953). Under Expected Utility, when the
winning probabilities of two lotteries are scaled down by a common factor, a person’s ranking
over those lotteries should not change. However, this is often not the case. To capture this
effect, we ask the participant to make two choices, one that measures risk aversion with a
certain alternative, and another in which both options are risky. In Risk Aversion: CR
Certain we elicit the amount b such that the participant is indifferent between a certain
amount a and a lottery paying b with probability α (and zero otherwise): that is, a lottery
equivalent of a sure amount. In Risk Aversion: CR Lottery, we elicit the amount c such
that the participant is indifferent between a lottery paying a with probability 1/x (and zero
otherwise), and c with probability α/x (and zero otherwise). Under Expected Utility, b = c.
The Common Ratio measure is then b− c (Dean and Ortoleva, 2015).
Ambiguity aversion is a preference (or beliefs that lead to a preference) for prospects
with known probabilities over those with unknown probabilities. To measure it, we use an
ambiguous urn filled with balls of two different colors. One color gives the participant a
positive payoff, and the other gives them zero. Participants do not know the proportion of
the different color balls in the urn, but are allowed to choose which color gives a positive
payoff. They are then asked for their certainty equivalent for a draw from this urn. If
participants have a prior over the composition of the urn, they must believe a draw from the
11
urn has a winning probability of at least 50%, yet many participants prefer a 50/50 lottery
with known odds. The difference between the certainty equivalent for a draw from the risky
urn—with a known composition of 50% of each color—and the ambigous urn is Ambiguity
Aversion.11 Similarly, a draw from a risky urn is usually more highly valued than one in
which the number of balls is unknown, but drawn from a uniform distribution—that is, a
compound lottery. The difference between the certainty equivalents for a draw from the
risky urn and one from a compound urn is Compound Lottery Aversion (Halevy, 2007).
2.3 Overconfidence
Overconfidence can be divided into three types. Overestimation refers to a person’s esti-
mate of her performance on a task (versus her actual performance). Overplacement refers
to her perceived performance relative to other participants (versus her real relative perfor-
mance). In order to measure these phenomena, we ask participants to complete two tasks,
and then ask them to estimate their performance on one, and their performance relative
to others taking the survey on the other. The difference between these subjective estima-
tions and actual performance (in absolute or percentile terms) give us overestimation and
overplacement, respectively (Moore and Healy, 2008).
Overprecision refers to a belief that one’s information is more precise than it actually
is. We ask participants to estimate a quantity (such as the year the telephone was invented),
and then tell us how close they think they were to the correct answer. To difference out
overprecision from justified precision, we regress how close the participant thought they were
on a fourth order polynomial of their accuracy (Ortoleva and Snowberg, 2015b,a).12
11The risk measure here is Risk Aversion: Urn, which matches the description above. Empirically,
this measure is highly correlated with Risk Aversion: Gains. Note that both Compound Lottery Aversion
and Ambiguity Aversion difference out the same quantity. If this quantity is measured with error, this can
create spurious correlation between Compound Lottery Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion. This issue, and
our solution, is discussed in Section 3.2.
12Note that the fact that both overprecision and overplacement refer to the same factual questions will
create correlated measurement error between them. This can create spurious correlation between the two
measures. This issue, and our solution, are discussed in Section 3.2.
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2.4 Patience (Time Preferences)
A payoff sometime in the future is generally seen as less valuable than a payoff of the same
size today. The value today of a fixed future payoff is Patience (Andersen et al., 2008).13
3 Implementation and Analysis
This section describes our representative, incentivized, survey, and the statistical techniques
used to eliminate the attenuating effects of measurement error.
3.1 Survey Implementation
Our study was given to a representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults online by the survey
company YouGov between March 30 and April 14, 2016. YouGov maintains a panel of
participants. It continually recruits new people, especially from difficult to reach and low
socio-economic-status groups. To generate a representative sample, it randomly draws peo-
ple from various Census Bureau products, and matches them on observables to members
of their panel. Oversampling and differential response rates lead to the over- and under-
representation of certain populations. Thus, YouGov provides sample weights to recover
estimates that would be obtained from a fully representative sample. We use these weights
throughout the paper.14
Incentivized questions pose additional challenges: stakes, and whether the experimenter
is seen as credible in making future payments or running randomizations as specified. Two
13An earlier attempt to measure present bias found very little, similar to some recent studies of financial
payments (see, for example, Augenblick et al., 2015). This may have occurred due to the fact that points
were, in general, not instantly convertible into consumption. Thus, we did not attempt to measure it here. A
general concern about such experiments is whether the participants trust the experimenter to follow through
with payment (Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012a). Using a survey company with established relationships with
its panelists seems to have largely mitigated this, as discount rates were quite low (δ was quite high).
14According to Pew Research, YouGov’s sampling and weighting procedure yields more representative
samples than traditional probability sampling methods with non-uniform response rates, including Pew’s
own probability sample (Pew Research Center, 2016, YouGov is Sample I).
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randomly selected questions were chosen for payment.15 To enhance the credibility of our
study, we took advantage of YouGov’s relationship with its panel and restricted the sample
to those who had already been paid (in cash or prizes) for their participation in surveys.
All outcomes to incentivized questions were expressed in points. This is an internal
YouGov currency used to pay participants. It can be converted to U.S. dollars, or prizes,
using the approximate rate of $0.001 per point.16 The average payment to participants was
around 9,000 points (or $9). The survey took participants between 45 minutes and an hour.
This compensation level is quite high for an internet survey, and represents a rate of pay
approximately three times the average for YouGov surveys.
3.2 Measurement Error
Measurement error causes a downward bias in correlations. This would make it more difficult
to pick out the clusters of inter-related measures. Moreover, this downward bias would also
make it difficult to know which behaviors are actually not related. To circumvent this issue,
we use the ORIV technique of Gillen et al. (2018), which uses the instrumental variables
approach to errors-in-variables to produce efficient, consistent estimates. At the heart of
this method is duplicate observations of variables—multiple elicitations that are similar, but
not exactly the same—that are likely to have orthogonal measurement error. This technique
takes duplicate measures and estimates a stacked regression where each X i is used as both
an independent variable and an instrument. This is done twice, once for each Y i, effectively
15We chose to pay for two randomly selected questions to increase the stakes while making fewer partic-
ipants upset about their payoffs. Paying for two questions instead of one may theoretically induce some
wealth effects, but these are known to be negligible, especially in an experiment such as ours (Charness et
al., 2016). Paying for randomly selected questions is incentive compatible under Expected Utility, but not
necessarily under more general risk preferences, where it is known that no such mechanism may exist (Karni
and Safra, 1987; Azrieli et al., Forthcoming). A growing literature suggests this theoretical concern may not
be empirically important (Beattie and Loomes, 1997; Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee, 2005; Kurata et al.,
2009), but there are some exceptions (Freeman et al., 2015).
16The conversion from points to awards can only be done at specific point values, which leads to a slightly
convex payoff schedule. This is of little concern here as these cash-out amounts are further apart than the
maximum payoff from this survey.
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averaging across all four specifications in the stacked regression model.17
Our setting requires us to deal with an additional issue: constructed variables will often
have correlated measurement error due to the nature of their construction. For example,
the Compound Lottery Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion measures are both constructed
by taking some behavior (the certainty equivalent for a compound or ambiguous urn), and
subtracting off the same quantity measured with error (certainty equivalent of a simple
risky urn). This leads to correlation in the measurement error of Ambiguity and Compound
Lottery Aversion. To avoid spurious correlations, we make use of the fact that we have two
observations for each measure, and modify the ORIV procedure so that the measurement
error in the instrument is uncorrelated with the measurement error in the left-hand-side
variable.18 We use this formulation for all sets of variables constructed from two elicitations:
Compound Lottery and Ambiguity Aversion, and Overplacement and Overprecision.
3.3 Multiple Hypothesis Testing
This paper displays a large number of correlations and standard errors. There are no theo-
retical predictions for most of the correlations we examine. Thus, we omit any description
of statistical testing or significance from our tables. However, if one were interested in null-
hypothesis statistical testing (NHST), the appropriate critical value for significance at the
5% level is between 1.96 for a single hypothesis test, and 3.82 using a Bonferroni (Dunn,
1958, 1961) correction for all 378 correlations underlying Sections 4 or 5.
17When we do not have an available duplicate for one of the measures, we use an approximation of ORIV
detailed in Footnote 31 of Gillen et al. (2018).
18Formally, Xi and Y i, i ∈ {1, 2} are two elicitations of X∗ and Y ∗ measured with error. For a given
i, Xi and Y i are constructed by subtracting the same quantity (measured with error) from two different
quantities. Thus, the measurement error in Xi and Y i are correlated for a given i, but the measurement
error in Xi and Y j , i 6= j are not. The stacked regression in ORIV is then modified to become:(
Y a
Y b
)
=
(
α1
α2
)
+ β
(
Xa
Xb
)
+ η, with instruments W =
(
Xb 0N
0N X
a
)
.
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3.4 Principal Component Analysis
We examine correlation matrices directly, and use principal component analysis (PCA) to
summarize them. The aim of PCA is to extract the m components most useful for explaining
n > m variables. Components are linear combinations of the variables. The first component
is constructed to capture the highest possible fraction of variance in the data (subject to the
constraint that the linear weights sum to one), the second to capture the highest fraction of
the remaining variance, conditional on being orthogonal to the first component, and so on.19
Once components are identified, the key question is, “How many are necessary to provide
a good description of the underlying data?” Heuristically, we want to retain components
only when the marginal explanatory power is high. In order to determine the number of
components to retain we use an approach which captures this intuition: parallel analysis.
Parallel analysis creates many random datasets with the same numbers of observations and
variables as the original data. The average eigenvalues of the resulting correlation matrices
are then computed. Components are kept as long as their associated eigenvalues are greater
in the actual data than the average in the randomly generated data.20
The retained components help to understand the relationship between the original vari-
ables in the dataset. The correlation between a component and a variable is called the
variable’s loading on that component. Variables that load heavily on the same component
are highly related. In order to facilitate interpretation, retained components can be rotated
relative to the data. We perform a Varimax rotation, which rotates the basis identified
from the specified number of components in order maximize the variance of squared loading
coefficients. This ensures that each component has a small number of large loadings.
In Section 5, we analyze whether the components we identify correlate with cognitive
and demographic measures. To reduce measurement error in the components, we multiply
19See Abdi and Williams (2010) for an introduction.
20The value of additional components is graphically represented by a “scree” plot. This shows the eigen-
values of the correlation matrix of the underlying data, and compares this with the average value of the
eigenvalues produced by parallel analysis. The scree plots for our analysis can be found in Appendix B.
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the weights by the average of the two copies of each variable. This leads to components that
are not orthogonal, although, in practice, they are quite close.21
4 Relationships between Econographics
The next two sections attempt to explain, as succinctly as possible, the relationships be-
tween 21 econographics variables. We begin by examining them separately. Next, we study
the relationships between econographics through a visual inspection of correlation matrices,
following up with principal components analyses to verify the observed patterns. This leads
to our central finding that the 21 econographics are well summarized by six principal compo-
nents. In the next section, we examine the relationship between these principal components
and cognitive abilities and demographics. As noted in the introduction, there are many ways
one might summarize these 378 relationships. Our approach is driven by the desire to create
an empirical basis for the underlying structure of more comprehensive theories of behavioral
decision-making, and by the hope that this is a relatively straight-forward way to do so.
We describe the relationships between econographics in three steps. First, we examine
social preferences, then risk preferences, and then combine social and risk preferences to-
gether with overconfidence measures and patience. This is done for simplicity, and because
each of the first two types of preferences may be of independent interest. Moreover, as our
results are largely driven by clusters of correlations, these clusters will not disappear when
additional measures are added to the analysis (although they may be augmented).
4.1 Summary Statistics
Most of the behaviors we measure appear to be quite similar to those found in the literature.
For all but one of the behaviors we elicit, a strict majority of participants exhibit behavior
21We could also construct two measures of each component, one from each set of duplicate variables. These
could then be used as instruments for each other. However, as the two resulting measures of each component
are correlated between 95%–99%, this results in only slightly greater coefficients, with standard errors that
are roughly twice as large due to the presence of a first stage. As such, we prefer averaging.
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consistent with the literature—for example, 71% of participants appear to be ambiguity
averse or ambiguity neutral.
The summary statistics in Table 2 show that behavior in our data is consistent with
standard findings in the laboratory. In addition to summary statistics, we also show the
percent of participants whose responses are in the “expected” direction. Surveying the
information in this column, the majority of participants are risk averse or risk neutral over
gains, risk loving over losses, inequality averse, exhibit an endowment effect and the common
ratio effect, are ambiguity averse, have a negative reaction to compound lotteries, and are
over-confident. (A majority of participants are not all of these things simultaneously.) Note
that although patience in this table is represented as a discount rate, in the correlational
analysis we code the variable as discussed in Section 2.4. Either coding gives the same
(directional) interpretation to correlations. However, the coding in Section 2.4 is linear in a
participant’s answer, allowing for the measurement error correction discussed in Section 3.2.
Our data exhibit fairly standard levels of noise. As discussed in Gillen et al. (2018) and
Snowberg and Yariv (2018) the correlation of duplicate measures—subtracted from one—
gives the level of noise in a particular elicitation. Gillen et al. (2018) report correlations of
around 0.65 between duplicate measures, using data from Caltech undergraduates. In most
cases the correlations we observe—in the final column of Table 2—are somewhat higher. This
implies that our data is less noisy than similar data obtained from Caltech undergraduates.
The exceptions are the overconfidence measures, which are noisier than the rest.22 When
there is no correlation listed we only have one elicitation of that behavior.
4.2 Links Between Social Preferences
There is ample opportunity to create a more parsimonious representation of social pref-
erences: altruism, trust, anti- and pro-social punishment, and distributional preferences.
These measures fall into three clusters shown in correlation Table 3: one formed by the
22Gillen et al. (2018) do not report data from overconfidence measures.
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two measures of reciprocity, and altruism and trust; a second formed by the willingness to
punish pro- and anti-social behavior; and a third formed by our two measures of inequality
aversion. These clusters are characterized by high within-cluster correlations and low corre-
lations between measures in different clusters. To make these clusters visually apparent, we
present the correlation matrix in the form of a “heat map” where the shade of red indicates
the magnitude of the correlation.23
The first correlation in the first cluster (0.86 between the two reciprocity measures), is a
useful example for interpretation. There are distinctions between those who are more and
less reciprocal when a partner is more or less generous, resulting in a less than perfect cor-
relation. Yet, the predominant behavioral distinction, reflected in the very high correlation,
is how reciprocal someone is in all conditions. This overarching behavior is (empirically)
related to both trust and altruism, although more closely to the former. As noted in the
introduction, although some readers may have anticipated some of these correlations, the
fact that the literature distinguishes between, say, different forms of reciprocity, indicates
that these anticipations are not universally shared.
The second cluster contains the two punishment measures.24 Like other clusters, they are
highly correlated with each other, but with few other measures. However, these measures,
unlike any others in our data, are characterized by both an extensive and intensive margin.
The extensive margin is whether or not someone punishes, and the intensive how much
punishment a person metes out. This leads to obvious questions about how these two
margins contribute to the overall relationship. The correlations on both margins are roughly
equal. About 2/3 of participants engage in pro-social punishment, whereas only 1/3 engage
in anti-social punishment. However, almost everyone who engages in anti-social punishment
23The shading is driven by a concave function of magnitude so that there is more differentiation between
magnitudes of 0 and 0.25 than there is between 0.25 and 1. We also show both the upper and lower part of
this symmetric matrix.
24As a reminder, both refer to costly punishments meted out on participants in a sender-receiver game
where the sender sent his or her entire endowment, and the receiver returned none. Pro-social punishment
refers to the amount used to punish the receiver, and anti-social punishment refers to the amount used to
punish the sender.
21
Table 4: Principal Components Analysis of Social Preferences
Inequality
Generosity Punishment Aversion Unexplained
Reciprocity: Low 0.52 0.04 -0.04 0.27
Reciprocity: High 0.52 0.03 0.00 0.27
Altruism 0.40 0.02 0.11 0.54
Trust 0.49 -0.02 -0.07 0.35
Anti-social Punishment -0.03 0.70 0.05 0.24
Pro-social Punishment 0.07 0.64 -0.03 0.37
Dislike Having More 0.17 -0.24 0.65 0.28
Dislike Having Less -0.13 0.17 0.75 0.22
Percent of Variation 34% 19% 16% 32%
Notes: First three principal components using the varimax rotation. Weights greater than or equal to
0.25 in bold.
also engages in pro-social punishment. Of those that engage in both types of punishment,
there is a strong positive correlation of about 0.4 in the amount they choose to spend on
punishment of both parties. Both the extensive and intensive margin are poorly related to
other measures of social preferences.
The third cluster contains the distributional preferences measures. It features the weak-
est intra-cluster correlation. Moreover, both measures in this cluster—Dislike Having More
and Dislike Having Less—are moderately correlated with other econographics. These mod-
erate correlations extend to some measures in the risk domain, leading to this component
combining with risk preferences in the analysis of all 21 econographics in Section 4.4.
Before turning to the principal components analysis (PCA), it is worth noting that there
is very little in the literature that indicates which specific correlations we should, and should
not, find. This could lead to a lot of plausible storytelling. For example, one might believe
that the dislike of having more (one form of inequality aversion) entirely motivates altruism,
and a dislike of having less (another form) motivates punishment. Yet, these patterns are
not present in our data. Alternatively, one might expect that the predominant feature of
distributional preferences is the presence or absence of a preference for equality, which would
22
generate the observed correlation between Dislike of Having More and Dislike of Having Less.
Whatever one’s priors (or lack thereof), these results should be informative. We discuss what
we believe are the biggest takeaways for theory in Section 6.
The PCA of these correlations shows the same decomposition: results appear in Table 4.
Three components are suggested for inclusion under parallel analysis—see Appendix Figure
B.1 for the scree plot. Together, these three components explain 68% of the variation in the
eight measures of social preferences we explore here.
These three components have fairly obvious interpretations. The first is generosity in
behaviors that directly influence the well-being of another person. The second is a general
affinity for punishment. The third and final component captures both types of inequal-
ity aversion. The components are thus named accordingly: Generosity, Punishment, and
Inequality Aversion.
Overall, these results show there is a clear structure to the connections between different
social preferences. These measures tend to group in clusters with high within-cluster cor-
relations and low across-cluster correlation. This structure likely leads to similar findings
using other latent-variable discovery techniques.
4.3 Links Between Risk Attitudes
In this subsection we show that models of decision-making under risk and uncertainty may
be too parsimonious. As shown by the clear clusters in Table 5, ambiguity aversion and
compound lottery aversion group together, blurring the line between risk and uncertainty.
Moreover, we find two clusters of risk attitudes related to WTA and WTP, respectively.
The easiest cluster to interpret contains Ambiguity and Compound Lottery Aversion.25
This high correlation is consistent with extant empirical work (Halevy, 2007; Dean and Or-
toleva, 2015; Gillen et al., 2018) and theoretical observation (Segal, 1990; Dean and Ortoleva,
25Note that these come from the certainty equivalent of a draw from an ambiguous (Ellsberg) or compound
urn minus the certainty equivalent from a 50/50 risky urn. In order to prevent spurious correlation, we adapt
the ORIV procedure as described in Section 3.2.
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2015). Note that both of these measures are essentially unrelated to measures of risk prefer-
ences, suggesting either a delineation between risk and uncertainty, with compound lotteries
grouped with ambiguity aversion, or the lack of a clean line between risk and ambiguity.
The two remaining clusters all contain risk attitudes, and suggest two separate aspects
of risk preferences. The first contains Risk Aversion: Gain, Loss, Gain/Loss, and WTA;
and the second includes Risk Aversion: CR Certainty, CR Lottery, and WTP. Crucially,
there are low correlations between the measures in different clusters (with the exception
of the relationship between Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss and WTP—correlated 0.3, meaning
that risk aversion using WTP is negatively correlated with risk aversion over losses). This
suggests that there are two separate aspects of risk aversion that are largely unrelated to each
other, or to preferences under uncertainty. Note that these two different aspects are both
within a fairly narrow domain: the valuation of risky lotteries. Thus, unlike psychology
research, which has shown differences in risk preferences across outcome domains, these
patterns suggest differences in preferences within the domain of money lotteries—the most
studied domain in choice theory, and experimental and behavioral economics.
These two separate aspects align with WTA and WTP, respectively, giving this division
substantive and theoretical importance. We find that certainty equivalents fall into one
cluster while lottery equivalents into another. This is in line with prior research finding that
different fixed elements in an MPL lead to different degrees of risk aversion. Here, as in the
literature, this is consistent with the fixed element of the MPL acting as a reference point
(Sprenger, 2015). Our results add, first, that these groups are largely uncorrelated with
each other, and, second, naturally align with WTA and WTP. WTA—where the lottery is
explicitly the reference point—naturally aligns with certainty equivalents: measures where
the lottery is fixed. Similarly, WTP aligns with measures with a fixed monetary amount.
At the same time, as we discuss in Section 6, and more in depth in Chapman et al. (2017),
our data are difficult to reconcile with current theoretical explanations. The most visible
signature of this difficulty in Table 5 is the lack of an obvious component of loss aversion
25
Table 6: Principal Components Analysis of Risk Preferences
Risk Risk
Aversion: Aversion: Uncertainty Unexplained
WTA WTP
WTA −0.51 −0.09 0.12 0.32
Risk Aversion: Gains 0.55 0.13 0.05 0.25
Risk Aversion: Losses 0.39 −0.21 0.09 0.45
Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss 0.53 −0.09 0.02 0.22
WTP 0.03 −0.54 −0.02 0.43
Risk Aversion: CR Certain 0.08 0.62 −0.06 0.29
Risk Aversion: CR Lottery −0.05 0.48 0.11 0.53
Ambiguity Aversion −0.01 −0.04 0.69 0.27
Compound Lottery Aversion 0.01 0.04 0.69 0.28
Percent of Variation 29% 21% 17% 34%
Notes: First three principal components using the varimax rotation. Weights greater than or equal to
0.25 in bold.
positively related to WTA and negatively related to Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss.
Before proceeding, it is worth discussing the two measures in the correlational table
that we do not include in the clusters or in the following principal components analysis:
the endowment effect and the common ratio effect. Both measures are the difference of
two other measures we already include: for example, the endowment effect is the difference
of the WTA and WTP. Thus, including all three measures in a PCA makes little sense.
As described above, our own recent research compiles extensive evidence that WTA and
WTP should be treated as separate behavioral measures. Thus, we include the component
measures (WTA and WTP) rather than the endowment effect (Chapman et al., 2017). We
take the same approach with the common ratio measures: entering the constituent measures
into the correlational and principal components analysis.26
Once again, the principal components analysis in Table 6 confirms the visual patterns
in the correlation table. The first three components explain 66% of the variation in the
26Entering the common ratio measure directly in the principal component analysis produces qualitatively
similar results to Table 6: see Table C.2.
26
nine measures of risk preferences considered here. The first and the second clearly capture
different aspects of risk attitudes. Following the discussion above, we use the names Risk
Aversion: WTA and Risk Aversion: WTP to describe them. The third encompasses more
complex lotteries, which may induce uncertainty: hence we use the title Uncertainty.
4.4 Putting it all Together
Analyzing all 21 econographics together leads to six components. The structure of compo-
nents from the risk and social domains are preserved, however, a social and risk component
combine. The sixth component is comprised of the three overconfidence measures. Time
preferences load on several components; most heavily on the Punishment component.
Analyzing risk and social preferences, together with overconfidence and time preferences,
is straight-forward because there are few important relationships between risk and social
preferences. However, they are not completely unrelated. One of the social preference
components (Inequality Aversion) combines with a risk-preference component (Risk Aver-
sion:WTP). Otherwise, the structure in the previous two subsections is largely unaltered.
The first and second components in Table 7 are similar to the first components in the
social and risk analyses, respectively. Thus, we retain the same names. Patience loads
moderately on both components: more generous and less risk averse people are more patient.
The third component is of particular interest. It combines the measures included in the
second risk component, Risk Aversion: WTP, with those of the third social component,
Inequality Aversion. This suggests that some aspects of social and risk preferences are
distinct, while others are more related. Moreover, this relationship follows a clear pattern
building upon the previously identified components: Inequality Aversion combines with Risk
Aversion: WTP. We note that both of these components deal with aversions to spreads—in
possible payoffs or distributional assignments. Thus, we conjecture that a similar form of
caution may lead participants to both dislike entering conditions of risk, as well as generically
dislike unequal allocations. Note, however, that this pertains only to entering a situation of
27
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risk (WTP for a lottery), rather than leaving one (WTA). In line with its constituent parts,
we call this component Inequality Aversion/WTP.
The fourth component loads heavily on all three overconfidence measures; accordingly, we
call it Overconfidence. Given existing work on the conceptual distinctions between different
types of overconfidence, the fact that they would load on a single component may not have
been ex ante obvious (Moore and Healy, 2008).
The fifth is the social component Punishment, to which (a bit of) time preferences have
been added. People who score highly on this component enjoy both pro- and anti-social
punishment, and are impatient. Thus, we dub this new component, Impulsivity.
The sixth component is essentially the same as the third risk component. Thus, we
continue to call this component Uncertainty.
Overall the underlying structure can be summarized with four points: 1) Six easy-to-
interpret and separate components explain 60% of the variance of our twenty-one variables;
2) The social and risk components do not change, but two of them—Risk Aversion: WTP
and Inequality Aversion—collapse into one; 3) Time preferences are captured by several
of the existing components, possibly signaling that they are related to many elements, al-
though none particularly strongly; and 4) Overconfidence measures are largely separate, and
captured by a single component.
5 Econographics and Other Measures
In this section we examine the correlation between our econographic components, cognitive
abilities, and demographics. This has two potential benefits. First, it may give us clues
as to the the psychological processes underlying these clusters. Second, it may may also
provide useful information about economic preferences. For example, understanding how
the components relate to demographics might be useful in understanding how preferences
might change as a population becomes older or better educated.
29
5.1 Econographics and Cognitive Measures
There are several important relationships between our six econographic components and the
two measures of cognition on our survey: IQ and the three-question Cognitive Reflection
Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). These two cognitive ability measures measures have an ORIV
correlation of > 0.8.27
Our IQ measure consists of two classes of questions drawn from the International Cog-
nitive Ability Resource, a public domain intelligence measure (ICAR; Condon and Revelle,
2014). We choose three matrix reasoning questions, similar to Raven’s Progressive Matrices.
In these questions, participants determine which of a set of possibilities correctly completed
a graphic pattern. We also construct a second battery of three questions based on 3-D rota-
tions: a drawing of a cube was shown, and participants had to identify which of a set of six
other drawings of a cube were compatible. These questions were chosen to try to capture a
variation in fluid intelligence in the general population.The specific questions were chosen to
be of progressively greater difficulty.28
There are several important relationships between our six econographic components and
IQ and the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT), shown in Table 8. Once again, we present
the correlations in the form of a heatmap where shade is indicative of magnitude. Unlike
prior sections that were primarily concerned with magnitudes, here, positive and negative
correlations have very different interpretations. As such, we distinguish between signs of the
correlation using different colors: blue for negative, and green for positive. Consistent with
the high correlation between the IQ and CRT measures, the general pattern of correlations
27The correlation uncorrected for measurement error is 0.46. Our survey also contained two instantiations
of the “beauty contest” measure of strategic sophistication (Nagel, 1995). Unfortunately, as in Snowberg
and Yariv (2018), we found that the distribution of responses is relatively uniform, with a spike in responses
at 50 (out of 100), as shown in Figure C.1. It is difficult to discern who is strategically sophisticated from
this pattern. Thus, we did not include these measures in our analysis.
28Condon and Revelle (2014) contains the percent of people that typically get each of their questions
correct. We used this information to attempt to cut the population at the 20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, 90th,
and 95th percentile. We were largely successful, with 21% answering no questions correctly, 24% answering
one correctly, 24% answering two correctly, 15% answering three correctly, 7% answering four correctly, 5%
answering five correctly, and 4% answering all six correctly.
30
Table 8: Correlations with Measures of Cognitive Ability
IQ CRT
Generosity 0.13 0.09
(.038) (.038)
Risk Aversion: WTA 0.02 0.04
(.040) (.039)
Inequality Aversion/WTP −0.13 −0.11
(.043) (.039)
Overconfidence −0.23 −0.12
(.050) (.049)
Impulsivity −0.24 −0.25
(.033) (.032)
Uncertainty 0.05 0.02
(.034) (.037)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors from 10,000 simulations in paren-
theses. Colors in heatmap change with each 0.05 of magnitude of cor-
relation. Blue hues indicate negative correlations, green hues positive
correlations.
is largely the same: higher cognitive ability is positively correlated with Generosity, and
negatively correlated with Inequality Aversion/WTP, Overconfidence, and Impulsivity.29
These results show that, in general, the underlying behavioral components that we have
identified are not simple proxies for intelligence. Moreover, there is a more nuanced re-
lationship between our measures of intelligence and the extent to which a participant is
“behavioral”—that is, behaves differently than a risk-neutral expected utility maximizer.
While it is the case that lower measured intelligence is related to higher impulsivity and
inequality aversion, it is also related to lower generosity. Moreover, risk and uncertainty at-
titudes are largely unrelated to intelligence, with much of the positive relationship between
Inequality Aversion/WTP, Overconfidence, and intelligence being driven by distributional
preferences.30
29Note that IQ is used to calculate one of the three main components of the Overconfidence measure, and
also has some weight in the other components, which might result in some spurious correlation. This is
unlikely to be a matter of great concern as the pattern of correlations with the CRT is largely the same.
30Appendix Table C.1 shows the relationships between individual econographics and cognitive measures.
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Table 9: Correlations with Demographics
Attend
Income Education Age Male Church
Panel A: Correlations
Generosity 0.10 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.15
(.046) (.049) (.047) (.046) (.046)
Risk Aversion: WTA 0.00 0.06 0.03 −0.03 0.02
(.049) (.046) (.050) (.047) (.054)
Inequality Aversion/WTP 0.05 −0.03 0.20 −0.08 −0.06
(.044) (.046) (.045) (.046) (.054)
Overconfidence 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.12
(.052) (.050) (.047) (.048) (.046)
Impulsivity −0.19 −0.22 0.05 0.04 0.05
(.045) (.039) (.045) (.047) (.046)
Uncertainty 0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.04 −0.04
(.045) (.044) (.043) (.045) (.041)
Panel B: Controlling for IQ
Generosity 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.04 0.16
(.045) (.048) (.046) (.049) (.048)
Risk Aversion:WTA 0.00 0.06 0.04 −0.03 0.02
(.047) (.045) (.049) (.047) (.053)
Inequality Aversion/WTP 0.07 −0.01 0.18 −0.07 −0.06
(.044) (.046) (.044) (.046) (.049)
Overconfidence 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.12 0.12
(.052) (.049) (.044) (.048) (.049)
Impulsivity −0.16 −0.18 0.01 0.06 0.04
(.047) (.041) (.045) (.047) (.044)
Uncertainty 0.02 0.00 0.00 −0.05 −0.04
(.045) (.043) (.043) (.046) (.040)
Notes: Bootstrapped standard errors from 10,000 simulations in parentheses. Colors in heatmap
change with each 0.05 of magnitude of correlation. Blue hues indicate negative correlations, green
hues positive correlations.
5.2 Econographics and Demographics
There are interesting relationships in our data between our components and standard eco-
nomic variables—such as income and education—or demographics—such as age and gender.
Table 9 shows these correlations in Panel A, and the same correlations controlling for IQ in
32
Panel B.31
Greater education and income are associated with higher Generosity and lower Impul-
sivity, as was the case with higher cognitive ability. This may be unsurprising, as education
and income are often associated with higher cognitive ability. However, as Panel B of Table
9 shows, these relations remain even after controlling for IQ. There is no association between
income or education and Overconfidence or Inequality Aversion/WTP; however, once we
control for cognitive abilities, we obtain that higher education is (slightly) correlated with
higher Overconfidence. That is, even though more education increases participants’ own
ability and knowledge, it seems to increase their perceptions of these skills even more. This
suggests, if anything, that education is not a “cure” for non-standard preferences.
Older people are more generous and men are more overconfident, in accordance with
the literature.32 These results only become stronger once we control for cognitive abilities.
Additionally, older people exhibit a higher Inequality Aversion/WTP score, while men are
slightly lower. As with cognitive abilities, we find that neither demographic is related to
the other risk component, Risk Aversion: WTA, adding nuance on the relation between
these aspects and risk preferences. Lastly, frequency of church attendance is positively
associated with Generosity. It is also positively associated with Overconfidence, although
not statistically significantly at conventional levels.
6 Relation to Current Theories
An important aim of our work is to provide data that will aid the construction of parsimo-
nious behavioral economic models across multiple domains. However, before setting out in
search of new theories, it is worth examining the extent to which our components align with
the concepts underlying current models.
31Appendix Table C.1 shows the relationships between individual econographics and demographics.
32Although not significant after Bonferroni correction, it is significant without. As this fact has been
previously shown, for example in Ortoleva and Snowberg (2015b), there is little risk of this being a spurious
correlation.
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Theories of social preferences can explain some of the correlations in our data, but not
the bigger picture found in the principal components analysis. Perhaps the most prevalent
characterization of social preferences is Fehr and Schmidt’s model of inequality aversion.
This adds two parameters to the standard model: one codes how much the decision maker
dislikes having more than other people, and the other how much they dislike having less. The
first of these parameters should govern behavior not only in the Dislike Having More task,
but also in Altruism and Reciprocity: High.33 While there is support for these predictions
(see Table 3), these relationships do not appear to underpin the most parsimonious way of
reading the data—described in Table 4. Indeed, none of the components we identify can
be clearly identified with the parameters of this model: Reciprocity: High and Altruism are
associated with a different component than Dislike Having More.
Our results exhibit inconsistencies with standard models of preferences under risk and
uncertainty. These models typically separate risk and uncertainty, with the distinction being
whether probabilities of outcomes are known or unknown (Arrow, 1951; Gilboa and Mari-
nacci, 2016). The curvature of the utility function, and possibly aspects of non-Expected
Utility, should affect behavior in both domains, while beliefs and ambiguity aversion should
only impact choice under uncertainty. In our data, the classic delineation between risk
and uncertainty fails to hold: attitudes towards compound lotteries, where probabilities are
known, are related to ambiguity aversion, where they are not. This empirical relationship
has been shown before, with different possible explanations (Halevy, 2007; Dean and Ortol-
eva, 2015; Gillen et al., 2018). Segal (1990) proposes that ambiguous prospects are treated
like compound lotteries, in which case probability weighting could explain both phenomena.
This theory would further imply a link between Ambiguity/Compound Lottery Aversion and
the Common Ratio effect. However, we do not observe this relationship in our data. An
alternative is to argue that compound lotteries are complex objects that people perceive as
33The model of Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) would imply similar correlations. The preceding discussion
focuses on outcome-based models of social preferences. Intention-based models, such as Rabin (1993) have
little bite in our setting, as only one of our choice environments—the trust game—has two players who both
make active choices.
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ambiguous (Dean and Ortoleva, 2015). In either case, these results point to different struc-
ture, where compound lotteries are associated with prospects with unknown probabilities.
The split into two separate types of risk preferences for objective, non-compound, risk is
also difficult to reconcile with models that treat risk aversion as a unitary phenomenon—for
example, driven by the curvature of a utility function. Although these components may
be linked to whether the task is similar to “buying” or “selling” a lottery, as proposed by
Sprenger (2015), our data is difficult to reconcile with either Prospect Theory (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) or Ko¨szegi and Rabin (2006). As we discuss extensively in Chapman
et al. (2017), the two clusters of risk attitudes we observe may be compatible with hybrid
models of reference dependence—albeit requiring very specific parameters, such that the
two forces offset each other exactly, leading to independent clusters. However, these models
make further predictions that fail to hold in our data. Most prominently, these models
predict a positive relation between risk aversion for lotteries involving gains and losses and
the endowment effect, as both behaviors are driven by loss aversion. However, we find they
are negatively related. Overall, the three clusters of risk attitudes we observe suggest a
specific structure of risk preferences that is inconsistent with current modeling.
7 Literature
We review two distinct areas of research. First, we briefly discuss the small, but significant,
literature that examines connections between two or three different behavioral regularities,
or between economic behavior and measured intelligence. Second, we describe in more
detail studies that have estimated the correlation structure between many different economic
behaviors. As far as we are aware, there are two contemporaneous projects that examine
multiple behaviors in representative samples, and a further two that use restricted samples.
No existing study is well suited to our purpose: to provide a basis for more parsimonious
behavioral models by examining the relationships between a wide range of behaviors in
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the risk, social, time, and confidence domains. Bilateral (or trilateral) analyses cannot
reveal clusters of behaviors that move together, and therefore may be governed by the same
underlying process. Studies that do contain multiple measures either focus on restricted
samples—which may produce unrepresentative patterns of connections—or on constellations
of measures that contain important differences from those we use. Moreover, studies with
several measures and representative samples do not use incentives, nor take steps to eliminate
the attenuating effects of measurement error.
7.1 Studies with a Small Number of Behavioral Measures
There are several laboratory studies of the relationship between different aspects of risk pref-
erences, and risk preferences and time preferences. Many of the findings from these studies
extend to our representative population. However, our results create a more nuanced picture
of the complicated relationships between different facets of risk attitudes. A few studies find
weak or non-existent relationships between attitudes towards risk and ambiguity/uncertainty
(see, for example, Cohen et al., 1987; Lauriola and Levin, 2001; Chakravarty and Roy, 2009;
Cohen et al., 2011; Ahn et al., 2014).34 Our findings are similar, and we also document the
relationship between ambiguity and compound lottery aversion previously established in a
student sample in Halevy (2007).35 Several studies describe and test theoretical relationships
between risk and time preferences—both of which are related to the curvature of utility func-
tions.36 Generally, in our data, there is some evidence the two are related, but our results
34von Gaudecker et al. (2011) document significant heterogeneity in the distribution of preference param-
eters governing risky choice in a broad population. However, due to the statistical methodology they employ
it would be difficult to examine correlations between these parameters.
35Abdellaoui et al. (2015) find a weaker relationship, although Gillen et al. (2018) show that findings of
weak relationships in experiments may be due to measurement error. We utilize Gillen et al.’s techniques in
order to avoid such issues.
36Andersen et al. (2008) find that taking into account risk attitudes reduces estimated discount rates,
implying a relationship between risk attitudes and discount rates calculated under the assumption of risk
neutrality (as we do in this paper). Andreoni and Sprenger (2012b) find evidence for a failure of interchange-
ability: inter-temporal preferences vary depending on whether the objects of choice are lotteries or certain
payments, which they interpret as evidence for different utility functions for risky and risk-free prospects.
Finally, Epper et al. (2011) find a significant relationship between decreasing impatience and probability
weighting in an experiment that links the two behaviors. Unlike our experiment, they estimate probabil-
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isolate the specific part of risk preferences that are associated with time preferences.
There are also papers which study the relationship between risk and/or time preferences
and measured intelligence (Burks et al. 2009; Dohmen et al. 2010; Benjamin et al. 2013—see
Dohmen et al. 2018 for a recent review). In aggregate, the literature suggests that higher
cognitive ability is associated with more risk aversion, but with some subtleties. Andersson
et al. (2016) suggest that the driving factor in these results might be increased noise in
choice, rather than changing preferences. Several other studies find the relationship between
risk aversion and cognitive ability to be negative in the gain domain and positive in the loss
domain. Our results suggest a further nuance, as we find differing relationships between
cognitive ability and the different components of risk attitudes we identify.
There are fewer studies of the relationships between different aspects of social preferences,
or between social preferences and risk. There is at least one prior study that documents a
positive correlation between risk and inequality aversion, based on the idea that from behind
a “veil of ignorance” inequality creates risk (Carlsson et al., 2005). There is conflicting
evidence on whether there is a connection between risk attitudes and sender behavior in a
trust game (Eckel and Wilson, 2004; Schechter, 2007). We find no such relationship.
7.2 Studies with Large Numbers of Behavioral Measures
Our work is differentiated from most prior studies that contain multiple measures in that
it has a large, representative sample. However, two contemporaneous projects have those
same features. Stango et al. (2017a) measure a broad set of 17 behavioral factors in a
representative sample of U.S. adults to study, in part, the relationships between them. Falk
et al. (2017) survey 80,000 adults across 80 countries to document patterns of six behaviors.37
These studies differ from ours in both purpose and implementation: they consider different
ity weighting parametrically from choices over lotteries, rather than using questions explicitly designed to
identify the existence of probability weighting.
37Becker et al. (2012) measure risk aversion, time preferences, trust, and altruism using incentivized
questions in a representative sample. However, they do not report the correlations between these behaviors,
as their goal is to study the links between these behaviors and personality.
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measures, do not use incentives, and do not take steps to eliminate the attenuating effects
of measurement error.
Stango et al. have three aims: to relate measured behavioral factors to financial outcomes,
to combine behavioral factors into a single measure of how “behavioral” a person is, and to
study the correlations between the measures.38 They collect non-incentivized measures of a
substantially different—and more heterogeneous—set of behaviors than we do. These include
many biases and mistakes, for example: the gambler’s fallacy, non-belief in the law of large
numbers, and exponential growth bias.39 Unlike our study, they do not include measures
of social preferences. As these studies are not designed to find common components within
and across risk and social preferences, their data are not optimized for this task.
Stango et al. find 1 to 3 components underlying their 17 measures. These components
appear to be connected with cognitive resources. They conclude that, “Our methods and
results suggest poor prospects for reducing the whole of (behavioral economics) to a man-
ageable number of (latent) traits, as had been done for intelligence and personality.” In
contrast, for the measure we focus on, we can summarize our data using a smaller number of
economically meaningful components. The difference is likely due to both the different set
of measures they use, representing measures using a behavioral/non-behavioral dichotomy
(rather than a continuum), and the fact that they do not take steps to reduce the attenuating
effects of measurement error.40
Falk et al. collect a subset of the measures we include here: patience, risk, positive
reciprocity, punishment, altruism, and trust. Each is measured through a combination of
qualitative self-reports and hypothetical-money questions. Again, because of their different
38See also Stango et al. (2017b).
39This is related to a literature in psychology that studies the empirical relationship between different kinds
of violations of rationality, such as base rate neglect and syllogistic reasoning (see, for example, Stanovich,
2011). Our focus is narrower in that we are more concerned with violations of the standard model of economic
choice, such as ambiguity aversion and altruism. These behaviors may represent preferences that are different
from those assumed by the classic economic model, rather than violations of rationality.
40Measurement error biases estimated correlations towards zero, reducing the number of meaningful com-
ponents recovered by standard dimension-reduction techniques, including the one we use—principal compo-
nents analysis (PCA). See Sections 3.2 and 3.4.
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aims, their data is unsuitable for our purpose. This is, in part, because their measures are
less specific than ours: for example they do not quantify the various different aspects of
risk preferences. Correlations between these preferences are generally lower than what we
observe (all are below 0.33). This may be due to the attenuating effects of measurement
error, or the fact that they examine a more diverse population (across 80 countries).
An immediate predecessor of this paper is Dean and Ortoleva (2015), which studies
relationships between many of the same behaviors in a sample of 180 Brown undergraduates.
These students are likely to be less heterogeneous on some dimensions, such as cognitive
ability. Dean and Ortoleva focus more on risk and time, and less on social preferences.
Finally, Burks et al. (2009) make use of a large scale experiment carried out on a group
of newly recruited truck drivers. The authors use parametric methods to measure risk
aversion, short-term and long-term discounting (though a beta-delta model) and behavior
in a sequential two-person prisoner’s dilemma (similar to our trust game). They find a
statistically significant (though quantitatively small) relationship between risk attitudes,
patience, and sender behavior in the trust game: more patient people tended to be less risk
averse and send more in the trust game.
Broadly speaking, to the extent that the studies use similar measures, all four tend to
find similar relationships. For example, Stango et al. find relationships between their various
overconfidence measures, Falk et al. find a relationship between altruism and reciprocity,
and Dean and Ortoleva find correlations between risk aversion over gains and losses, and
between reactions to ambiguous and compound lotteries.41
8 Conclusion
We elicit 21 econographics from a representative sample of 1,000 U.S. adults in order to
create an empirical basis for the underlying structure of more comprehensive theories of be-
41There are also some differences, but the reasons for these seem inseparable from the reasons for broad
disagreement, discussed above.
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havioral decision-making. We identify six easy-to-interpret econographic components that
explain a large fraction of the variance in these 21 econographic variables: Generosity, Risk
Aversion: WTA, Inequality Aversion/WTP, Overconfidence, Impulsivity, and Uncertainty.
These components suggest that more parsimonious representations of social preferences are
possible, but that canonical theories of risk preferences are perhaps too parsimonious. More-
over, they suggest limited, and nuanced, connections between risk and social preferences. By
studying the relationship between the components we identify and cognitive measures and
demographics, we document several stylized facts that may be useful for theorizing.
A strength of our study is the number of behaviors included in our analysis. However,
the behaviors we included were limited by the current literature.42 These, in turn, present
limits for our analyses. A nuanced view of these limitations comes from thinking about what
would happen if we had included more, or fewer, measures, which we do in the remainder of
this paper. This exercise also speaks to the robustness of our results.
Including a duplicate elicitation of “Risk Aversion: Gains” has little qualitative effect on
our conclusions, as shown in Table C.3. This duplicate measure loads heavily on the second
component in Table 7, and this component now becomes the first (in terms of percent of
variation explained).43 Thus, the ranking of components may respond to the inclusion or
exclusion of measures. As such, we have not attached meaning to the ordering in the text.
Removing Dislike Having More reduces the number of components in Table 4 to two, but
has little qualitative effect on the overall analysis of Table 7, as shown in Table C.4.44 Dislike
Having Less still combines with the variables in the Risk Aversion: WTP component to form
Inequality Aversion/WTP. Thus, it appears that minor perturbations are not particularly
consequential, although these exercises have little to say about larger changes.
42For example, we would have liked to have a measure of motivated reasoning. However, we were unable
to find such a measure in the literature, and our design principals, discussed in Section 3, dictated that we
not attempt to invent our own.
43This measure, Risk Aversion: Urn is described in Footnote 11. Note that this measure also loads on the
uncertainty component, although the correlations that leads to this loading are spurious, as Risk Aversion:
Urn is used in constructing both of the measures that comprise the uncertainty component.
44The number of components is determined, as before, using parallel analysis. In analyzing just the social
preference measures, the Dislike Having Less loads on the punishment component.
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The robustness here stems from the fact that the most correlations between measures—
displayed, for example, in Table 3 and 5—are either large or close to zero.45 There are
a few middling correlations—such as those between Dislike Having More and other social
preference measures. These are the likely sources of fragility in PCA. Adding a variable
with a number of middling correlations may cause parallel analysis to suggest the inclusion
of an additional component, and this inclusion may lead to extensive changes in existing
components. As such, the components are useful for making sense of the large correlation
matrices in our analysis. However, the correlation matrices themselves are the most robust—
and consequential—part of the analysis, as these are the fundamental patterns upon which
any latent variable model, such as PCA, is built.
Overall, this discussion suggests that our main conclusions—that there is an underlying
structure to our measures that is informative for theorizing—are robust. However, we note
that our findings relate to a fairly specific domain of economic behaviors: choices over money
lotteries, time, the distribution of resources between two people, and beliefs about oneself
and others. Adding more measures might create broader clusters that increase the average
number of measures per component, or lead to a more diffuse set of underlying dimensions.
Whatever the outcome of such explorations, it is worth noting that a failure to reduce all
economically-relevant behaviors to just a handful of components is not a failure of behavioral
economics. Chemistry has been incredibly successful with more than 100 elements. It should
be our goal to accurately and adequately describe economic behavior with no more, and no
fewer, components than are necessary. This study takes a step in that direction.
45Note that the preceding two paragraphs are not comprehensive tests of robustness. Rather, they are
meant to illustrate patterns in the data, and build intuition on how PCA responds to small changes in the
underlying behaviors examined.
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Online Appendix—Not Intended for Publication
A Survey Implementation
A.1 Measures
This section builds on Section 2 with a more direct description of how we instantiate the
various measures discussed there. In the interest of brevity, measures are summarized as
succinctly as possible. The specific question wordings, randomization of question ordering,
screenshots, and so on are online at hss.caltech.edu/∼snowberg/wep.html. As mentioned in
Section 3.2, in order to reduce issues related to measurement error, we elicit many quantities
twice, and apply ORIV. We sometimes refer to these second elicitations as “duplicates.”
A.1.1 Altruism, Trust, Reciprocity, and Punishment
Altruism: Participants are given 6,000 points to allocate, in 1,000 point increments, be-
tween themselves and another randomly chosen participant (Forsythe et al., 1994). The
amount given to the other participant is our measure of altruism.
Trust: Participants play a standard sender-receiver trust game, in both the sender and
receiver roles (Berg et al., 1995). As the sender, they are given another stock of 6,000
points to keep or to send to a randomly chosen participant—the receiver—in 1,000 point
increments.1 The amount sent is doubled, and then the receiver can send some portion of
the total back, which is again doubled. We treat the amount sent as our measure of trust.
Reciprocity, High and Low: We elicit the responses of each participant, acting as a
receiver, to each possible quantity of points he or she may receive in the trust game. These
are in 2,000 point increments, from 2,000 to 12,000 points, reflecting the six possible amounts
1Participants are informed that this randomly chosen participant is different from the one in the dictator
game.
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that may be sent. As we do not observe the response of the receiver to the lowest possible
action (sending 0 points), it is possible that receivers encode sending 1,000 points as a
neutral, or even positive, action. As such, we call the response to receiving 2,000 points
“Reciprocity: Low”, with the amount sent back when receiving 4,000 points as the duplicate
measure for ORIV. Symmetrically, we label the amount sent back when receiving 12,000
points as “Reciprocity: High,” although it could safely be labeled positive reciprocity. The
amount sent back when receiving 10,000 points is the duplicate measure for ORIV.
Pro- and Anti-social Punishment: Participants observe another sender-receiver trust
game that they do not participate in, in which the sender sent 6,000 points and the receiver
sent back 0 points, resulting in payoff of 12,000 for the receiver and 0 for the sender. Partici-
pants are given a stock of 4,000 points, which they can use to deplete the points of the sender
and the receiver. Each point spent depletes the points of the targeted individual (the sender
or the receiver) by six points. They can spend up to 2,000 points punishing each participant,
and any unused points are kept. Participants are told (truthfully) that no one will have the
opportunity to punish their own behavior, and that if their responses are randomly selected
for implementation, no one else will have the opportunity to punish the sender or receiver.2
The amount used punishing the receiver is our measure of pro-social punishment, as this
can be seen as a participant attempting to enforce the pro-social norm of trust. We label
the amount used to punish the sender anti-social punishment (as extensively documented in
Herrmann et al., 2008).3
A.1.2 Distributional Preferences
Our design for eliciting distributional preferences follows Kerschbamer (2015), which nests
several popular models including Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Charness and Rabin (2002).
2This measure was made incentive compatible by applying the chosen punishments to additional partici-
pants recruited to take part in a lab experiment.
3Note that in the context of public goods games, pro-social punishment is sometimes referred to in the
literature as “third-party costly punishment.” (Bendor and Swistak, 2001; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004).
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This technique results in two measures. In both of these, the participant decides on an
allocation of points between themselves and another, randomly-matched, participant.
Dislike Having Less: In each line of the MPL, the participant decides between an even
allocation (say, 4,000 points each), or an uneven allocation that favors another participant.
In the uneven allocation, the other participant always receives the same amount, which is
greater than both the even allocation and the allocation to the the participant making the
decision (say, 6,500 points). Each line of the MPL increments the amount to the participant
making the choice (from, say, 1,600 points to 6,400 points). This defines how much the
decision-making participant is willing to forgo in order to avoid having less than the other
participant. Note that this quantity can be negative, in the sense that being willing to take,
say, 3,000 points in order to ensure the other person will get 6,500 points means they are
willing to forgo some points to ensure that the other person has more. Note, however, that
a negative quantity here does not imply that the participant dislikes having more.
Dislike Having More: In this case, the participant is deciding between an even split, and
another split that would give the other participant a lower total (say, 1,500 points) and the
decision-making participant more (say, between 1,600 and 6,500 points). Once again, this
quantity can be negative if the decision-making participant is willing to diminish their own
points in order to ensure that they get more.
A.1.3 Risk and Loss Aversion
This and the following three sets of measures require participants to price lotteries in various
ways. All lotteries involve only two possible payoffs, and most assign 50% probability to each.
The specific point values of the lotteries used to measure each quantity can be found in Table
A.1. Question wordings and screenshots can be found at hss.caltech.edu/∼snowberg/wep.html.
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Risk Aversion: Gains: Participants are asked to give their certainty equivalent, using
an MPL, for two lotteries containing either gains, or a gain and a zero amount.
Risk Aversion: Losses: Certainty equivalents are elicited for two lotteries that contain
either only losses, or a loss and a zero amount.
Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss: Certainty equivalents are elicited for two lotteries that con-
tain a loss and a gain of equal magnitude.
A.1.4 Common Ratio
The common ratio effect suggests non-linear preferences over, or misperceptions of, proba-
bilities (Allais, 1953).
Risk Aversion: CR Certain: The participant gives the lottery equivalent for a fixed
certain amount a. That is, for a fixed probability α, this question identifies b such that
a ∼ αb+ (1− α)0 for that participant. (b is sometimes referred to as a gain-equivalent.)
Risk Aversion: CR Lottery: Fixing a ratio x > 1, we use the same a and α as above, and
the participant gives lottery equivalent c such that (1/x)a+(1−1/x)0 ∼ (α/x)c+(1−α/x)0.
Common Ratio: Under Expected Utility, b = c. We measure the common ratio effect as
the difference between the two measures, b− c.
A.1.5 Uncertainty
Risk Aversion: Urn: This is similar to “Risk Aversion: Gains” however, the participant
is told that his or her payment is tied to a random draw from a jar with 100 balls, divided
50/50 between two colors, rather that being told there is a 50% probability of a certain
payment. One color is tied to a high payoff, and the other to a zero payoff. In this and
the following two measures the participant is asked to choose which color they would like to
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result in the high payoff. Empirically, this measure is highly correlated with “Risk Aversion:
Gains”, and is primarily used to difference out the risk component from ambiguous and
compound urns.4
Compound Lottery Aversion: The payoffs from this lottery are also tied to a draw
from an urn. However, participants are told that the exact composition of the urn is not yet
determined. Rather, a number between 0 and 100 will be drawn, and this will be the number
of balls of a specific color in the jar, and the other color will make up the remaining balls.
The certainty equivalent for this lottery, minus the certainty equivalent for Risk Aversion:
Urn is the measure of compound lottery aversion (Halevy, 2007).
Ambiguity Aversion: Here, the payoffs are tied to a draw from an Ellsberg (1961) urn—
that is, an urn with an unknown proportion of balls of each color. The certainty equivalent
for this lottery, minus the certainty equivalent for Risk Aversion: Urn is the measure of
ambiguity aversion.
Note that both Compound Lottery Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion difference out the
same quantity. If this quantity is measured with error, this can create spurious correlation
between Compound Lottery Aversion and Ambiguity Aversion. This issue, and our solution,
are discussed in Section 3.2.
A.1.6 Endowment Effect
WTP: Participants are given a stock of points they can divide between keeping and buying
a lottery ticket, using an MPL. The amount they are willing to spend on the ticket is used
as their willingness to pay (WTP).
WTA: Participants are endowed with a lottery ticket, and their selling price is elicited
using an MPL. The amount they are willing to sell the ticket for is their willingness to
4It is also used to illustrate an aspect of principal components analysis in Section 8.
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Table A.1: Lotteries Used for Risk Measures
Lottery 1 Lottery 2
Panel A: Fixed Lotteries
Risk Aversion: Gains 0.5 ∗ 0⊕ 0.5 ∗ 5,000 0.5 ∗ 1,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 4,000
Risk Aversion: Losses 0.5 ∗ −5,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 0 0.5 ∗ −4,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ −1,000
Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss 0.5 ∗ −5,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 5,000 0.5 ∗ −4,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 4,000
Risk Aversion: Urn 0.5 ∗ 0⊕ 0.5 ∗ 10,000 0.5 ∗ 0⊕ 0.5 ∗ 8,000
Compound Lottery Aversion 0.5 ∗ 0⊕ 0.5 ∗ 10,000 0.5 ∗ 0⊕ 0.5 ∗ 8,000
Ambiguity Aversion Ambiguous {0, 10,000} Ambiguous {0, 8,000}
WTA 0.5 ∗ 1,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 10,000 0.5 ∗ 2,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 8,000
WTP 0.5 ∗ 1,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 10,000 0.5 ∗ 2,000⊕ 0.5 ∗ 8,000
Panel B: Variable Lotteries
Common Ratio: High Probability
Fixed (a) 2,500 4,000
Variable
0.2 ∗ 0⊕ 0.8 ∗ b 0.25 ∗ 0⊕ 0.75 ∗ b′
b ∈ [2,200, 7,000] y ∈ [3,600, 10,000]
Common Ratio: Low Probability
Fixed (a) 0.75 ∗ 0⊕ 0.25 ∗ 2,500 0.8 ∗ 0⊕ 0.2 ∗ 4,000
Variable
0.8 ∗ 0⊕ 0.2 ∗ c 0.85 ∗ 0⊕ 0.15 ∗ c′
c ∈ [2,200, 7,000] c′ ∈ [3,600, 10,000]
Notes: Possible values for b, c ∈ {2200, 2500, 2800, 3100, 3400, 3700, 4000, 4300, 4600, 4900, 5200, 5500,
5800, 6100, 6400, 6700, 7000}, and b′, c′ ∈ {3600, 4000, 4400, 4800, 5200, 5600, 6000, 6400, 6800, 7200, 7600,
8000, 8400, 8800, 9200, 9600, 10000}.
accept (WTA).
Endowment Effect: The endowment effect is measured as the difference between WTA
and WTP for the same lottery ticket (Kahneman et al., 1990; Plott and Zeiler, 2005).
The same two lottery tickets are used in both WTA and WTP. In order to avoid con-
sistency effects, one of WTA or WTP is elicited near the beginning of the survey, and the
other is elicited near the end. Whether WTA or WTP comes first for a given participant is
randomly determined.
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A.1.7 Overconfidence
Overconfidence can be divided into three types: overestimation, overplacement, and over-
precision (Moore and Healy, 2008). Overestimation refers to a person’s estimate of her
performance on a task (versus her actual performance). Overplacement refers to her per-
ceived performance relative to other participants (versus her real relative performance).
Overprecision refers to a belief that one’s information is more precise than it actually is.
Overestimation: After each block of three questions on the in-survey IQ test (described in
Section 5.1) the participant was asked how many questions they thought they got correct (out
of three). This, minus the actual number correct is used as our measure of overestimation.
Overprecision: Our measures of overprecision and overplacement follow Ortoleva and
Snowberg (2015b,a). Participants are asked two factual questions: about the year the tele-
phone was invented, and the current unemployment rate. After each factual question, the
participant is asked for a qualitative assessment of the accuracy of their answer. This residual
from a regression of this measure on a fourth-order polynomial of the participant’s accuracy
gives overprecision.
Overplacement: After giving their subjective perception of how accurate their answers
were, the participant is asked to give their perception about their accuracy compared to a
random group of 100 other survey takers. This answer is the perceived percentile of their
accuracy. The actual percentile of their accuracy is subtracted from this number to give our
measure of overplacement.
Note that as both overprecision and overplacement refer to the same factual questions,
this will create correlated measurement error between them. This can create spurious cor-
relation between the two measures. This issue, and our solution, is discussed in Section
3.2.
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A.1.8 Patience (Time Preferences)
Patience is measured using the standard “Money Earlier or Later” (MEL) paradigm (for
example, Marzilli Ericson et al., 2015). Participants were offered 4,000 points in 45 days,
and, in the duplicate, 6,000 points in 90 days. In each row of an MPL, the participant could
select the delayed payment, or an alternative amount immediately, where the alternative
amount varied between rows.
B Scree Plots for PCA Analyses
Figure B.1: Scree Graphs PCA of Social Measures
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Figure B.2: Scree Graphs PCA of Risk Measures
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Figure B.3: Scree Graphs PCA of Risk, Social, Overconfidence and Time Preferences
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C Other Analyses
Figure C.1: CDF of responses to “Beauty Contest” questions show no signs of strategic
sophistication.
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Table C.1: Correlations of Econographics with Cognitive Measures and Demographics
Attend
IQ CRT Income Education Age Male Church
Reciprocity: Low 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.19
(.041) (.041) (.048) (.052) (.044) (.048) (.043)
Reciprocity: High 0.15 0.09 0.08 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.19
(.038) (.039) (.044) (.049) (.044) (.047) (.042)
Altruism −0.03 −0.05 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04
(.046) (.047) (.047) (.046) (.047) (.046) (.046)
Trust 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.08
(.040) (.039) (.043) (.042) (.043) (.043) (.044)
Anti-Social −0.23 −0.26 −0.17 −0.21 0.03 −0.01 0.02
Punishment (.034) (.032) (.047) (.043) (.043) (.047) (.044)
Pro-Social −0.01 −0.03 −0.07 −0.10 0.03 0.08 0.03
Punishment (.040) (.041) (.045) (.043) (.046) (.044) (.044)
Dislike 0.17 0.14 0.17 0.09 0.10 −0.11 0.02
Having More (.037) (.043) (.045) (.046) (.055) (.049) (.060)
Dislike −0.09 −0.08 0.03 0.00 0.13 −0.18 0.03
Having Less (.041) (.048) (.046) (.044) (.051) (.042) (.053)
WTA −0.04 −0.09 −0.03 −0.10 −0.03 0.01 0.00
(.041) (.036) (.052) (.048) (.049) (.050) (.052)
Risk Aversion: 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.08 −0.01 −0.01
Gains (.043) (.040) (.052) (.050) (.050) (.050) (.054)
Risk Aversion: 0.00 −0.03 −0.08 −0.03 0.01 −0.06 0.06
Losses (.045) (.048) (.056) (.056) (.058) (.055) (.062)
Risk Aversion: 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.06 −0.01 −0.08 0.05
Gain/Loss (.043) (.044) (.050) (.051) (.054) (.051) (.057)
WTP 0.06 0.05 −0.08 0.04 −0.11 0.03 0.09
(.046) (.046) (.047) (.053) (.046) (.049) (.051)
Risk Aversion: −0.01 0.03 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.03 0.03
CR Certain (.041) (.040) (.049) (.047) (.044) (.048) (.048)
Risk Aversion: −0.11 −0.11 −0.05 −0.04 0.08 −0.04 −0.08
CR Lottery (.047) (.044) (.048) (.048) (.051) (.050) (.051)
Ambiguity 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.00 −0.02 0.02 −0.03
Aversion (.040) (.041) (.047) (.047) (.046) (.049) (.045)
Compound Lott. 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 −0.01 −0.06 −0.07
Aversion (.040) (.043) (.050) (.053) (.054) (.053) (.046)
Overestimation −0.62 −0.22 −0.09 −0.11 0.20 0.12 0.18
(.061) (.059) (.063) (.059) (.060) (.064) (.062)
Overplacement −0.04 −0.01 0.11 0.05 0.06 −0.07 0.10
(.089) (.067) (.066) (.075) (.075) (.077) (.085)
Overprecision 0.03 −0.03 0.10 0.13 −0.07 0.16 0.10
(.062) (.060) (.063) (.064) (.061) (.061) (.069)
Patience 0.23 0.21 0.16 0.16 0.04 −0.08 0.06
(.038) (.039) (.051) (.046) (.050) (.054) (.056)
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Table C.2: Principal Components Analysis of Risk Preferences with Common Ratio Measure
Risk Risk
Aversion: Aversion: Uncertainty Unexplained
WTA WTP
WTA −0.50 0.09 0.11 0.33
Risk Aversion: Gains 0.54 0.08 −0.17 0.24
Risk Aversion: Losses 0.37 0.04 0.39 0.35
Risk Aversion: Gain/Loss 0.52 0.01 0.15 0.22
WTP 0.05 −0.09 0.66 0.39
Common Ratio 0.20 −0.09 −0.59 0.47
Ambiguity Aversion 0.00 0.70 0.02 0.27
Compound Lottery Aversion 0.01 0.69 −0.03 0.28
Percent of Variation 33% 19% 17% 32%
Notes: First three principal components using the varimax rotation. Weights greater than or equal to
0.25 in bold.
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